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ABSTRACT. Sustainability assessments bring together different perspectives that pertain to sustainability to produce overall
assessments, and a wealth of approaches and tools have been developed in the past decades. However, two major problems remain.
The problem of integration concerns the surplus of possibilities for integration; different tools produce different assessments. The
problem of implementation concerns the barrier between assessment and transformation; assessments do not lead to the expected
changes in practice. We aim to analyze issues of complementarity in sustainability assessment and transformation as a key to better
handling the problems of integration and implementation. Based on a generalization of Niels Bohr’s complementarity from quantum
mechanics, we have identified two forms of complementarity in sustainability assessment, observer stance complementarity and value
complementarity. Unlike many other problems of sustainability assessment, complementarity is of a fundamental character connected
to the very conditions for observation. Therefore, complementarity cannot be overcome methodologically, only handled better or worse.
Science is essential to the societal goal of sustainability, but these issues of complementarity impede the constructive role of science in
the transition to more sustainable structures and practices in food systems. The agencies of sustainability assessment and transformation
need to be acutely aware of the importance of different perspectives and values and the complementarities that may be connected to
these differences. An improved understanding of complementarity can help to better recognize and handle issues of complementarity.
These deliberations have relevance not only for sustainability assessment, but more generally for transdisciplinary research on wicked
problems.
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INTRODUCTION
Sustainability is a key concern for modern society and better and
more sustainable food systems is crucial to these concerns. To
develop food system sustainability, there is a need to make overall
assessments of the effects of food systems on environment and
nature, animal welfare, human health and well-being, etc., and to
bring those assessments into practice.  
The semantic (or discourse) of sustainability emerged around
1980, less than four decades ago, and it has since grown to have
an immense public, political, and scientific importance. However,
unlike other semantics, like nature conservation, animal welfare,
and hunger reduction, sustainability is a paradoxical perspective,
in the sense that this semantic wishes to comprise the whole, but
must rely on a multitude of scientific perspectives (Noe and Alrøe
2015). Therefore, there is no one overall perspective from which
sustainability assessment can be made. To establish itself  as a
functioning semantic in society, sustainability therefore has to
take the form of a multiperspectival or polyocular semantic based
on observations of the observations of different specialized
perspectives. Moreover, there is no one fixed idea of sustainability;
new concerns arise continuously in society and new perspectives
emerge in science, such as, notably, climate change in the
mid-1980s, which must be included, and the observation of
sustainability can never be exhausted or concluded. This inherent
paradoxicality of sustainability as a semantic and as a scientific
perspective, but not, e.g., as a social norm, forms an unsteady
ground for the field of sustainability assessment.  
Nevertheless, a wealth of sustainability assessment methods has
been developed by science. However, because of the
paradoxicality and complexity of sustainability, there are some
fundamental methodological issues in sustainability assessment
that need to be addressed. In particular, there are two major
problems in sustainability assessment that are yet to be resolved.
We call them “the integration problem” and “the implementation
problem.”  
The integration problem concerns the surplus of possibilities for
integration. Assessing the overall effects is crucial to the
sustainable development of food systems, but also a challenge
because food systems cannot be fully assessed from any one single
research perspective (Thorsøe et al. 2014). In the last decades
many sustainability assessment methods have been developed that
are presented as integrated, “holistic,” or multicriteria tools for
observing and assessing sustainability because these tools
integrate a range of different indicators pertaining to
sustainability (e.g., Ness et al. 2007, Van Passel and Meul 2012).
The problem is that these methods are very different in scope and
way of integration, they produce different assessments, and none
of them can claim to have the right answer (e.g., Reed et al. 2005,
Schader et al. 2014). This problem becomes very visible when we
look at the indexes that are typically produced by sustainability
tools as a means of integrating the multiple assessments and
indicators that the tool utilizes. Whether the tool produces one
overall index (typically a number between 0 and 100) or a range
of indexes presented in a diagram, any difference will be obvious
and call for an explanation.  
Often such differences are not seen, however, because only one
tool has been applied to any one instance. But efforts are made
to shed light on the differences and make the assessment results
more comparable, such as the global Sustainability Assessment
of Food and Agriculture Systems (SAFA) guidelines initiative
(see, e.g., Schader et al. 2014), and to categorize the different
sustainability assessment tools and provide guidance on how to
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choose the most appropriate tool for each situation (Ness et al.
2007, Gasparatos and Scolobig 2012, Van Passel and Meul 2012,
Marchand et al. 2014, Schader et al. 2014).  
Unexplained differences and disagreements between different
approaches and sustainability tools will not be helpful in bringing
sustainability assessments into practice, because they turn public
debate into nothing but a rhetorical game. However, there is a
deeper implementation problem, which concerns methodological
questions of how to bring complex assessments into food system
practices and lead to sustainability transformations or transitions
(we use these terms interchangeably, cf. e.g., Olsson et al. 2014).
This implementation problem has been recognized as a key
problem in assessments of food system sustainability (e.g., Triste
et al. 2014). Sustainability assessments are complex and typically
made by experts, whereas sustainability transformation involves
changes in a range of practices involving different actors. And the
implementation problem, the problem of getting from
sustainability assessment to sustainability transformation, is
connected to the methodological choices made in making overall
sustainability assessments. (In the following we will talk of
“sustainability assessment and transformation” or use only
“sustainability assessment” to include both, as in the title of the
paper. This reflects our understanding of assessment as part of a
larger process of problem solving and transition, and as will
become clear, this is crucial to the purpose of the paper.)  
A common approach to the implementation problem is to focus
on stakeholder involvement and public participation to facilitate
the transition toward more sustainable practices, technologies,
and organizational structures (e.g., Fraser et al. 2006, Videira et
al. 2010, Von Korff et al. 2012). It is generally agreed that better
decisions are implemented with less conflict and more success
when they are driven by stakeholders; that is, by those who will
bear their consequences and carry out the actions for change
(Beierle 2002, Voinov and Bousquet 2010). The last decades have
thus seen the development of a range of participatory assessment
techniques and participatory practices aimed at promoting
sustainability (e.g., Gregory 2000, Palerm 2000, Tippett et al.
2007, Walker 2007, Thabrew et al. 2009). However, in many cases
the results have been disappointing, and disillusionment has
grown among practitioners and stakeholders who have felt let
down when the many benefits that have been claimed for
participation are not realized (Frame and Brown 2008, Reed
2008). The challenge emerging from the scientific literature is thus
that whereas research and experience suggest that stakeholder
involvement is crucial to the successful implementation of
methods of sustainability assessment in food systems
development, there seems to be deeper issues at play than whether
or not to involve stakeholders.
Hypothesis and aim of this paper
We pose the hypothesis that the “stubborn” problems of
integration and implementation in sustainability assessment are,
at least to some degree, determined by issues of complementarity.
We use complementarity in the radical sense of Niels Bohr,
meaning that two observations of an object, such as the
determination of the position and momentum of an elementary
particle, exclude each other in a way that prevents getting the full
picture of the object, so that we are left with complementary
phenomena that cannot be combined. Such complementarity is
deep; it is based in the very nature of the object and the
observational and experimental possibilities. (Complementary in
this radical sense is very different from complementary
understood as “supplementary” in the sense that different
assessment methods can supplement each other in a way that
makes it possible to combine them and use them in a harmonious
manner, e.g., Rotmans 2006).  
The reason for posing this hypothesis is that we, in our own
research experiences with assessments of food systems, have often
found conflicts that are not merely conflicts of interest, but more
fundamental cognitive conflicts caused by incompatible
perspectives and values (cf. Alrøe and Noe 2011, 2014a, Thorsøe
et al. 2014). And we have found that Bohr’s complementarity from
quantum physics offers a model for such stubborn and
insurmountable cognitive delimitations (in line with Barad 2007).  
The question of complementarity in sustainability assessment
and transformation has, as far as we know, not yet received any
attention. Yet we believe it to be an important question, because
complementarity in this sense cannot be overcome through, e.g.,
involving more stakeholders, introducing new methods of
negotiation of interests and values, constructing new methods of
integrating sustainability indicators and methods, or making
more detailed and complex assessments. Genuine cases of
complementarity, if  such cases exist in sustainability assessment,
must be handled in a different way that takes into account the
fundamental epistemological issues at play. We therefore aim to
analyze issues of complementarity as a key to understanding
crucial challenges in sustainability assessment and transformation,
and as a tool for better handling problems of integration and
implementation.
THE COMPLEMENTARITY PRINCIPLE
Niels Bohr modestly characterized his principle of
complementarity as a “general viewpoint,” but in fact he argued
for a revolutionary change in our philosophical understanding of
the scientific description of nature (Folse 1985, Barad 2007). Bohr
claimed that the paradoxes found when viewing quantum physics
from the viewpoint of classical physics had led to an unavoidable
fundamental revision of the conceptual basis on which the
scientific description of nature rests.  
Complementarity was at the center of Bohr’s famous debate with
Einstein over the completeness of quantum mechanics, whereby
he stated that the lesson from quantum physics, “discloses ... an
essential inadequacy of the customary viewpoint of natural
philosophy for a rational account of physical phenomena of the
type with which we are concerned in quantum mechanics,” and
that, “the finite interaction between object and measuring
agencies conditioned by the very existence of the quantum of
action entails ... the necessity of a final renunciation of the
classical ideal of causality and a radical revision of our attitude
towards the problem of physical reality” (Bohr 1935:697).  
Quantum physical complementarity arises where the necessary
interaction with the observed object cannot be disregarded,
because the observed objects are sufficiently small that the
quantum of action becomes significant. Popularly speaking, the
position of a particle cannot be observed without the radiation
involved in the observation influencing the momentum of the
particle. More correctly, measuring the position will make the
momentum indeterminate, and vice versa (cf. Barad 2007).  
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The complementarity view was suited to embrace the
characteristic features of individuality of quantum phenomena,
and at the same time to clarify the peculiar aspects of the
observational problem in this field of experience. Bohr
emphasized that even though quantum phenomena are very
different from classical physics, the accounts of quantum
experiments must be expressed in an unambiguous language,
which in this case means that the experimental arrangement and
the results of the observations must be described in ordinary
language making use of the terminology of classical physics.  
Complementarity “implies the impossibility of any sharp
separation between the behaviour of atomic objects and the
interaction with the measuring instruments which serve to define
the conditions under which the phenomena appear. ...
Consequently, evidence obtained under different experimental
conditions cannot be comprehended within a single picture, but
must be regarded as complementary in the sense that only the
totality of the phenomena exhausts the possible information
about the objects” (Bohr 1949:210).  
Bohr further advocated that the very word “phenomenon” be
applied exclusively to refer to the observations obtained under
specific circumstances, including an account of the whole
experimental arrangement (Bohr 1955). When two different
observations of the same object mutually exclude each other, we
end up with “complementary phenomena” in Bohr’s sense. The
reasons for such mutual exclusion are to be found in the conditions
for observation as they are determined by the structures of the
observing system(s) and the observed object. In short,
complementarity for Bohr means simultaneously necessary and
mutually exclusive (Barad 2007).
The generalization of complementarity
Bohr believed that the demands of complementarity in quantum
mechanics and of relativity in the theory of relativity were both
a result of novel aspects of the observation problem, namely the
recognition that observation in physics is context-dependent
because of the existence of, respectively, a minimum quantum of
action and a maximum velocity of propagation of all actions
(Faye 2014). Because of these universal limits it is impossible, in
quantum mechanics, to make a sharp distinction between the
behavior of the object and its interaction with the means of
observation and, in the theory of relativity, to make an
unambiguous separation between time and space without
reference to the observer. Bohr was thus acutely aware of the
epistemological lessons to be learned from the new physics.
Moreover, it is clear that Bohr intended to establish
complementarity as a contribution to the general philosophical
clarification of the principles underlying human knowledge, and
in no way restricted to the analysis of only the specific paradoxes
that arise in the quantum mechanical description of atomic
systems (Folse 1985).  
From 1935 to his death in 1962, Bohr’s overriding philosophical
goal was to bring the epistemological lesson of complementarity
to fields other than atomic physics, such as biology, psychology,
and anthropology (Holton 1970, Folse 1985, Favrholdt 1999). He
wrote, for example, about the complementarity between
molecular dynamics and organism behavior (or between
mechanistic and teleological accounts) in biology, between
thoughts and sentiments (or between descriptions of reasons to
act and feelings of free will) in psychology, and between justice
and mercy in ethics. The latter suggestion gave rise to our work
on value complementarity, which we will describe in detail further
below. Others have worked with the extension of complementarity
to, e.g., mathematics (Otte 2003), biological and social structures
(Pattee 1978), matter-symbol complementarity in biosemiotics
(Pattee and Rączaszek-Leonardi 2012), political science
(Rasmussen 1987), and consciousness (Jahn 2007).  
Karen Barad (2007) argues against the method of generalizing
complementarity by analogy, entertained by others, and even
often by Bohr; instead, she follows the deeper philosophical
implications of Bohr’s thinking, and we agree in this approach.
Bohr was convinced that complementarity teaches a lesson about
the use of concepts for describing all phenomena. The quantum
of action, which is the key to the necessity of complementarity
in quantum physics, is important only to quantum physics. A
generalization of complementarity must therefore be based on
Bohr’s broader lesson from quantum physics, that “‘phenomena’
are the ontological inseparability of objects and apparatuses”
(Barad 2007:128), and that, “Not only, of course, have we learnt
that every observation involves a disturbance of the phenomena;
we have furthermore realized that the whole concept of
observation requires a separation between the object and the
means of observation.” (Bohr 1931, as cited in Favrholdt
1999:521). (Bohr later renounced talking about the “disturbance
of phenomena by observation,” in favor of “observations
obtained under specified circumstances, including an account of
the whole experimental arrangement” Bohr 1955:53).  
Following Bohr’s general lesson, we can say that the three
fundamental conditions for observation are (1) the separation of
the observer (in a general sense, including the observational
apparatus) and the observed object, (2) the interaction between
the observer and the observed object, and (3) the observer’s
representation of the observed object (Alrøe and Noe 2011). A
phenomenon, in Bohr’s sense, involves all these three conditions
of observation. Because of the ontological inseparability of the
object and the conditions for observation, every observation must
construct a separation, a cut that delineates what is observer and
what is observed (see further in Barad 2007).  
To clarify the understanding of observation and representation
here, we employ the powerful semiotic framework of Charles S.
Peirce, which lays out an elaborate theory of representation and
signs (e.g., Nöth 2011). In particular, Peirce distinguishes between
the immediate object, “the object as the sign represents it,” and
the dynamical object, “the really efficient but not immediately
present object” (Peirce 1998:482). There is no position from where
we can observe the dynamical object as it is in itself, but every
perspective adds to the number of immediate objects that refer
to, point at, or hint at the dynamical object (Alrøe and Noe 2014a).
It is important to note here that the Peircean notion of immediate
object is congruent with the Bohrian concept of phenomenon.
Peirce’s sign is triadic, a sign represents an object to an
interpretant, and the representation mediates not only ideas,
concepts, or cognitions, but also the feelings, wishes, desires, and
actions resulting from the interpretation of the sign (Nöth 2011).
Representation is thus to be understood not only in a semiotic
sense, but also in an interacting, or intra-acting and performative
(cf. Barad 2007), sense. If  we, on this basis, are to formulate the
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principle of complementarity in more general terms, it states that
complementary observations are observations of the same
(dynamic) object that mutually exclude each other because of the
conditions for observation, and which both, or all, contribute to
the representation of that object.
A general, methodological form of complementarity
Based on the above generalization of the notion of
complementarity, we are able to formulate new conceptions of
complementarity that are more generally applicable in science.
All empirical sciences share the common “problem of
observation,” the problem of devising a framework suitable for
the unambiguous description of the phenomena in question,
given that observation cannot take place without interaction. In
cases where this interaction cannot be ignored, the conditions for
defining the observed system as it is (without interaction)
precludes the conditions necessary for observing it (with
interaction), and Bohr considered these two distinct modes of
description as complementary, each pursuing a goal necessary for
the employment of the other (Folse 1985). We consider this a
methodological form of complementarity, which can be applied
to science in general. Jürgen Habermas has used the term
“cognitive interests” to characterize such methodologically
distinct processes of inquiry (Habermas 1987), and more
generally we can speak of the complementarity between two
modes of science, one characterized by a detached observer stance
focusing on describing the world as it is and producing general
knowledge, and the other characterized by an involved observer
stance focusing on enabling action and change in concrete
contexts (cf. Alrøe and Kristensen 2002). This fundamental
methodological complementarity is one of the forms of
complementarity that we will elaborate on in the following in
connection to sustainability assessment. For lack of a better term,
we will call it “detached-involved observer stance complementarity,”
or “observer stance complementarity” for short.
Complementarity and perspectivism
According to Bohr, complementary phenomena are due to the
mutual exclusion between different observations that contribute
to the representation of an object, and this complementarity is
determined by the very conditions for observation in the form of
the structures of the observing system(s) and the observed object.
Bohr’s complementarity viewpoint can thus be seen as a form of
perspectivism (cf. also Peña 1991, Chevalley 1994). The
elaboration of this connection between complementarity and
perspectivism can help clarify the basis for a generalization of
complementarity, and thereby help illuminate possible issues of
complementarity in sustainability assessment.  
A perspective is here understood as that which determines what
an observer can observe and what it cannot observe, and
perspectivism can be characterized plainly in a few sentences:
There is no outside perspective on the world; all knowledge comes
from a certain perspective; all learning happens in concrete
perspectives on the world, which are part of the world, and which
can themselves be made objects of observation (Alrøe and Noe
2011).  
Perspectivism has had a long but marginal presence in philosophy,
with roots in Kant and Nietzsche (Palmquist 1993, Anderson
1998, Hales and Welshon 2000). Over the last decades the
cognitive understanding of science, where the focus is on scientific
models and representation rather than theories and truth, has
been growing and developing in philosophy of science (e.g., Giere
1988, Cartwright 1999, van Fraassen 2008). Recently, an explicitly
perspectival philosophy of science has been developed (Giere
2006, Wimsatt 1994, Alrøe and Noe 2011, 2014a, Callebaut 2012).
This implies that all scientific knowledge is created in scientific
perspectives, and that scientific knowledge, representations, and
measurement outcomes (data) are perspectival (van Fraassen
2008).  
Scientific perspectives determine what the observing systems of
science can observe and what they cannot observe. A discipline,
or more often a subdiscipline or “research school,” is an example
of a scientific perspective. Scientific perspectives are both
cognitive and social communicative systems, which are
autopoietic. That is, they create and reproduce their own meaning
through internal processes; they produce their own methods,
theories, and instruments for observation, and thereby also their
own inputs in the form of observations and data (cf. Luhmann
1990, 1995, Alrøe 2000). As part of this reproduction a scientific
perspective harbors certain concepts, theories, classifications,
instruments, problems, and values that delimit and focus the
observational field, and make possible the observation of certain
phenomena and aspects.  
The connection between complementarity and perspectivism is
important for two reasons. First, the elaboration of the structure
of the perspective can help illuminate the conditions for
observation that may give rise to complementarity. Second,
clarification of the autopoietic closure of scientific perspectives
involved in, e.g., sustainability assessment and other cross-
disciplinary research activities and the characteristics of their
conditions for observation can help point out issues of
incommensurability and complementarity between these
perspectives (the notion of incommensurability will be discussed
later). Examples show that an explicitly perspectivist framework
can help to reveal the perspectives in play and how they determine
the observations made (Alrøe and Noe 2014b, Læssøe et al. 2014,
Thorsøe et al. 2014).  
In general we may speak of perspectival complementarity and the
possibility that different scientific perspectives may be
complementary. But we think such general notions of
complementarity can be made more precise by investigating what
exactly it is that makes the observations from one perspective
preclude observations from another perspective, and we believe
such elaboration can clarify how these instances of
complementarity could be handled.  
To be more concise, an observation is a relation between observer
and observed (cf. Alrøe and Noe 2011, 2014a); a relation that at
the same time establishes the perspective as the frame of the
observation and the phenomenon as the result of the observation.
In line with Bohr, these three can and should not be treated
separately; phenomena, including scientific data, etc., must
always be treated as observations from a certain perspective
(Bohr’s “very conditions” of observation including the whole
experimental arrangement). And complementary observations,
complementary phenomena, and complementary perspectives
are therefore three different entry points to the same set of both
necessary and mutually excluding observational relations.
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OBSERVER STANCE COMPLEMENTARITY
The fundamental methodological form of complementarity that
we characterized as observer stance complementarity in the
previous section stems from the difference between a detached
and an involved observer stance. In sciences that work with
complex research worlds, research approaches that take a
detached observer stance to describe the world as it is, are very
different and in fact incompatible with research approaches that
take an involved observer stance to facilitate change and
development (Alrøe and Kristensen 2002).  
For instance, there are two very different forms of farm research.
One form focuses on monitoring farms as they are “on their own”
so to speak, to get a better image of how they function and to be
able to model agriculture on an overall level by incorporating
detailed knowledge of the internal processes of the farm. To do
this kind of research it is important that the researchers keep
detached and do not interfere with how the farm is managed,
because this would bias the results. The other form focuses on
how to help improve the function of farms by making research
based tools and procedures that can help make the management
more effective and responsive to problems in the production. To
do this kind of research it is important that the researchers get
involved in how the observations and decisions at the farm are
made. These two kinds of farm research are mutually exclusive,
but they are both needed to get a full understanding of farms.  
The crux is that the mutual exclusion between these two kinds of
farm research is due to the individuality of the farm as a self-
organizing (autopoietic) system (Noe and Alrøe 2003, Noe et al.
2015), similar to the situation in quantum physics due to the
individuality of quantum phenomena (see above). Sustainability
assessment and transformation always involves social systems
that have their own perspectives, with meaning, values, and logics.
Therefore, it is important to be attentive to observer stances and
the possibility of observer stance complementarity. We analyze
three examples of observer stance complementarity that are
relevant to the assessment of food system sustainability.
Cognitive interest: description versus development
In a study of the choice of sustainability assessment tools at the
farm level, Marchand et al. (2014) determined key characteristics
of different tools. They define two types of tools: (1) complex,
expert-based “full” sustainability assessment tools and (2)
simpler, participatory “rapid” sustainability assessment tools.
Full assessment tools make use of detailed farm data and/or
expert information, they need trained advisers and/or expert visits
to gather the data, and they take a long time and are expensive to
carry out. Rapid assessment tools make use of the farmer’s
knowledge or readily available data, allow an audit by the farmer
or an adviser, and they are relatively short in duration and less
costly. These constraints about data, time, and budget affect
additional characteristics, such as output accuracy, data
correctness and availability, user-friendliness, compatibility,
transparency, and complexity.  
The full assessment tools are suitable for monitoring
sustainability aspects of farming systems. They have high output
accuracy and can potentially be used for certification. But the
user-friendliness for a farmer or adviser is rather low, because of
the time-consuming, expensive data gathering and complex data
processing. The rapid assessment tools are more oriented toward
communicating and learning. They are suitable for use by groups
of farmers to help raise awareness, trigger farmers to become
interested in sustainable farming, and highlight areas of good or
bad performance. They are more user-friendly and less complex
than the full assessment tools, using transparent and
understandable indicators based on management options. But
they have rather low output accuracy.  
An important point is that full descriptive assessment methods,
which produce general knowledge, are methodologically
complementary to rapid developmental assessment methods,
which focus on enabling action and change in concrete contexts,
because of their basis in a detached and an involved observer
stance, respectively. In this respect they can be seen as two
mutually excluding forms of sustainability assessment based on
different cognitive interests. Full assessments are directed at
monitoring (description) and must be general and not site-
specific, because they need to be tested, well documented, and
standardized. Rapid assessments are directed at learning
(development) and must be concrete and site specific, because
each site harbors specific perspectives and values. The two
approaches exclude each other because the rapid assessments do
not allow for full, well-documented descriptions, and the full
assessments do not provide individual directions for actions and
change. Furthermore, it is not possible to find some optimal
middle form that incorporates the strength of both full and rapid
assessments; combining both functions within one tool has
proved to be ineffective (Triste et al. 2014).  
Marchand et al. (2014) conclude that these two approaches have
complementary strengths and weaknesses and should be used in
a complementary way (in line with the overview of
complementarities between different sustainability assessment
methods in Van Passel and Meul 2012). And they recommend
first choosing a clear and well-defined function, either monitoring
or learning, as a basis for selecting or developing a sustainability
assessment tool.  
This suggestion for complementary use of sustainability
assessment tools is not connected to a deeper analysis of the basis
for the complementarity. But the suggestion shows recognition of
the deep methodological differences between full sustainability
assessment tools, focusing on detailed description and
monitoring, and rapid sustainability assessment tools, oriented
toward communication and learning. We argue that this is not a
case of complementarity in a loose or shallow sense, but a deep
observer stance complementarity that cannot be overcome
methodologically.
Assessment position: from without versus from within
Usually, sustainability assessment tools are developed and
directed by scientists and other experts from outside the systems
of food production and consumption. Even when, as in the
example of the rapid, developmental tools above, the assessment
operates with an involved observer stance, it is typically directed
by outside experts. For instance, Schader et al. (2014) identified
two prevalent perspectives on sustainability in assessments of
food system sustainability: The business or farm perspective
describes whether the farm is able to sustain itself  for an extended
period of time. The societal perspective assesses whether a farm
contributes to a sustainable development of society. Any one tool
has to choose a perspective for selecting the proper indicators,
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and the different assessment perspectives may well lead to
contradictory impact assessment results. This is clearly a case of
observer stance complementarity due to the use of different
perspectives, or observer stances, observing the farm from within
or from without. But the assessment is still directed by outside
experts.  
The second example presented here shows a more radical
approach that takes the involved observer stance one step further,
by accommodating the idea of food systems as self-organizing
social systems with their own perspectives, with meaning, values,
and logics, and thereby their own observer stance from within.
The MultiTrust project (2011-2014) investigated methods to make
and communicate balanced overall assessments of the effects of
organic food systems on society, environment, and nature to help
organic actors develop the organic food systems in accordance
with the organic principles and in synergy with societal objectives
(Alrøe and Noe 2014b). The focus on organic food systems made
it obvious that the sustainability assessments had to be tailored
to the food system because the organic understanding of
sustainability (based on the principles of organic agriculture,
IFOAM 2005) is quite different from some of the other
understandings of sustainability (cf. Alrøe et al. 2006).  
Based on the realization that both sustainability assessments and
food systems are inherently value-based, and that a key to
successful implementation of such assessments therefore is to
make values and perspectives explicit in a participatory process,
the project focused on the question of how to communicate values.
The conclusions from a multistakeholder workshop on how
overall assessments may benefit the development of organic food
systems were the following: (1) assessments should be driven by
user needs, (2) assessments must be used in chains, and (3)
assessments should focus on tangible initiatives (Alrøe and Noe
2014c).  
These conclusions have quite far-reaching consequences for the
development of participatory assessment tools:  
1. For assessments to be user driven, there has to be an option
for discussing and influencing the criteria, i.e., values used
for assessing, on which the assessment is based. But often
criteria are determined by expert ideas about what is
important. And generally the existing sustainability
assessment tools are quite inept in exposing and handling
values. 
2. Most tools have focused on single entities like farms,
businesses, sectors or countries, or single products, and not
on the interaction between links in food chains or food
systems. But transitions toward better and more sustainable
food systems require synchronized changes in practices
across food chains and systems. 
3. The focus on tangible initiatives, or “good examples,” such
as a farm biogas plant or a retail packaging reduction plan,
points in another direction than the typical assessment tool,
which is focused on entities or products. Tangible initiatives
are easier to communicate across different actors and
stakeholders because they provide concrete and palpable
objects that are amenable to common understanding. 
As a result of this line of work, the MultiTrust project proposed
a cooperative communicational platform for developing more
sustainable food chains (see an animated sketch of this tool on
https://youtu.be/UF15_4knPUA). The proposed tool works by
revealing and communicating the value-laden criteria used by
different actors in the food chain, i.e., producers, processors,
retailers, consumers, etc., for selecting goods and taking new
development initiatives (Alrøe and Noe 2014c, see also the
discussion in Kastberg 2015). Communicating about values (in
the form of criteria) and concrete initiatives enables the actors in
the chain to know in what direction other actors are moving and
coordinate their own decisions and actions accordingly. For
instance, producer criteria and initiatives may influence consumer
choices, and the criteria and buying strategies of consumers may
influence strategic producer decisions. Sustainability transformation
of food systems is a complex undertaking that requires mediation
of values (cf. Noe and Alrøe 2011) and synchronization of actions.
If  any link, be that production, processing, sale, or consumption,
lags behind, the transformation is stopped in its tracks.  
The form of observer stance complementarity found here is
between making assessments from without and from within. But
this example is a radically different approach to assessment of
food system sustainability from assessments directed by outside
experts (illustrated above), because here the assessments enter
only in the place and form required by the actors in the food chain.
The food chain determines what is needed in the form of
assessments to assist sustainability transformation, and the
proposed tool can help to do this by enabling mediation of values
and determination of the criteria needed for a relevant and
consistent assessment.
Use of knowledge: risk versus precaution
The third example shows how the complementarity between
observer stances is related to a derived form of complementarity
in the use of knowledge in assessments of food systems. In
1998-1999 a major survey was carried out to assess the overall
consequences of phasing out the use of pesticides in Danish
agriculture. The so-called Bichel assessment included the
modeling of a 100% conversion of Danish agriculture to organic
production as one approach to phasing out pesticides (DEPA
1999, Alrøe and Kristensen 2001). This work illustrates a
significant methodological issue in sustainability assessment
research. A total transition to organic agriculture implies radical
changes to the present agricultural systems, and although the
models implemented in the survey were based on all the available
scientific knowledge, the work revealed insufficient knowledge in
many areas. This, in turn, made it clear that the modeling could
not be done without an inquiry into the limits of scientific
knowledge.  
The Bichel assessment therefore involved a lively discussion about
the role of the precautionary principle and the distinction between
risk assessment and precaution. Risk assessment is concerned
with the calculation of proportional risks and benefits from
available scientific knowledge, whereas the precautionary
principle prescribes acting before conclusive scientific
understanding is available in front of possible irreversible damage.
The two are mutually exclusive and the choice between them is
connected to different conceptions of human knowledge and
control and different views of nature and the relation between
human and nature.  
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The principle of precautionary acting arises out of an awareness
of the human dependency on the environment, together with
recognition of the growing human influence on the environment
and the fact that the consequences of this influence are to some
degree unknown and uncontrollable. Furthermore, there is an
important distinction between a separative or distinctive
conception of the human relationship to nature, which sees
humans as basically separate from nature, and a systemic
conception that sees humans as basically an integral part of nature
(see below). Organic agriculture has the latter view, which is more
congruent with precaution toward environment and nature.  
The use or nonuse of the precautionary principle is a complex
issue that involves ethics and politics as well as views of
knowledge, control and nature. “Precaution above all requires a
society able and willing to invest in the future, the need for which
cannot be 'proven' in advance, but must remain a matter of faith”
(Boehmer-Christiansen 1994:57).  
But the comprehensive work in the Bichel assessment on modeling
the overall consequences of a 100% conversion to organic
agriculture identified the precautionary principle as one of the
key questions to be resolved before an assessment of this radical
transition could be made. The precautionary principle enters into
the practices and regulations of organic agriculture, and it enters
into environmental law and societal decisions in some countries,
but it is not possible to integrate precaution into a model-based
assessment approach. In the Bichel assessment, despite that it was
considered a key issue and that precaution was recognized as a
fundamental principle in organic agriculture, it was left as an add-
on, as a commentary on the results of the modeling.  
The point of this example is twofold. First, that the choice between
a detached and an involved observer stance also involves different
views on the limits of scientific knowledge, the role of local
ecological knowledge, and normative principles such as the
precautionary principle. Second, that the involved observer
stance, i.e., including the precautionary principle, contains
substantial methodological challenges compared to common
science-based assessments from a detached observer stance.  
The observer stance complementarity in question here is thus a
complementarity that involves not only the complementarity
between from without and from within, but also, following from
this, the complementarity between risk assessment and
precaution as a methodological challenge for sustainability
assessment. “The precautionary principle applies to sustainability
assessment as well as in it” (Gibson et al. 2013:186 [emphasis in
the original]).
VALUE COMPLEMENTARITY
In our search for possible issues of complementarity in
sustainability assessment we have, in addition to observer stance
complementarity, found a number of issues that we characterize
as “value complementarity.” Values are in general a key
component of scientific perspectives (Alrøe and Noe 2011), and
in sustainability assessment values are even more crucial because
there can be no assessment without value (Gasparatos 2010,
Thorsøe et al. 2014). In his efforts to generalize the
complementarity principle, Bohr suggested the complementarity
between contemplation and volition, between justice and mercy,
and between values of different cultural traditions (Bohr 1955,
1961 as cited in Favrholdt 1999). Following these leads and many
years of experience with assessment of food systems, we propose
that value complementarity is an important and widespread form
of complementarity in sustainability assessment.  
Assessments are inherently value based; they are always
judgments of better and worse in some sense, though these values
are often more or less hidden. For instance, indicators are chosen
as measures for certain aspects of food systems because they are
“important to us” in certain ways. Hartmut Bossel (2001) has
suggested the term “orientor” for the way an indicator is
important: “It does not make much sense to develop indicator
systems without explicit reference to the orientors about which
they are to provide information. But that means starting by first
analyzing the fundamental interests or orientors of the system for
which we want to define indicators.” (Bossel 1999:26). More
generally, sustainability assessment relies on multiple specialized
assessment perspectives, each of which is based on built-in and
mostly hidden values, which are embedded in the methods and
tools used (Gasparatos 2010). At a very basic level, the values are
built into indicator scores, which transform judgements of good
and bad (the orientors) in relation to different indicators into
numbers from 0 to 1 based on functions of indicator measures.  
The different values in different assessment perspectives may be
incompatible, and this may lead to issues of complementarity. In
fact we argue that there is a special form of complementarity,
which we call value complementarity. Value complementarity
differs from the methodologically focused observer stance
complementarity that we described in the previous section (and
the original complementarity of quantum mechanics) by focusing
on the normative conditions for observation. In methodologically
based complementarity two observations mutually exclude each
other because of the conditions for observation as they are
determined by the structures of the observing system(s) and the
observed object. In value complementarity the mutual exclusion
of two observations of the same object stems not primarily from
the methodological options for observation but from different
values that determine what observations are relevant or desirable
in one perspective compared to another. (Secondarily, there may
well be methodological constraints involved in value
complementarity, but the primary cause is a difference in values.)
The determination of what observations are relevant or desirable
is exactly what takes place in the construction of assessment tools
in terms of embedded values (Gasparatos 2010), and in the
construction of indicators in terms of orientors (Bossel 1999).  
The reason for the incompatibility that leads to mutual exclusion
and value complementarity can be understood from a relational
conception of value (cf. Noe and Alrøe 2011, Læssøe et al. 2014).
In a relational perspective, value relations are primary entities that
belong neither to the subject nor to the object (Pirsig 1999, Barad
2007). Because of the relational nature of values, there are limits
to how values can be combined and integrated. A value relation
is a basic form of preference, and we may think of value
incompatibility as a sort of path dependency, when one path has
been chosen out of two possible, the other path is no longer
available or possible.  
We believe value complementarity is of key importance in
sustainability assessment, though these constraints are not
generally recognized at the moment. To identify possible issues
Ecology and Society 21(1): 30
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol21/iss1/art30/
of value complementarity, we may look to conceptual analyses
of value-laden concepts in science such as food quality, soil
quality, sustainability, animal welfare, justice, health, etc. Often
these philosophical analyses reveal different meanings of such key
scientific concepts that are connected with different scientific
perspectives such as disciplines, subdisciplines, and research
schools. We analyze three examples of value complementarity
that are relevant to the assessment of food system sustainability.
Animal welfare: naturalness versus care
Among other suggested value-laden and conceptual differences
in animal welfare (e.g., Fraser 2008), we find two very different
and conflicting perspectives that can be characterized as
naturalness versus care, of which pursuit of naturalness is found
particularly in the context of organic agriculture, outdoor pig
production, and other alternative forms of production (Lund
2006, Alrøe et al. 2001, Vaarst and Alrøe 2012). In a naturalness
or natural life perspective, animals are seen as basically natural
creatures that are kept and bred in artificial conditions, and
therefore free range and other nature-like production systems are
preferred. Research studies focus on the conditions and behavior
of the animals compared to natural conditions and natural
behavior, often referring to inherited instincts and the possibilities
for natural behavior such as caring for offspring and moving
around. Observations are made on, e.g., feather picking, tail
biting, and stereotype behavior such as repeated movements of
the head (weaving) and pacing the enclosure. The values that
underpin naturalness is that freedom is good for the animals and
exertion of natural behavior is a sign of good animal welfare.  
In a care perspective the important thing is whether the animals
are healthy and function well in the production system. Research
studies focus on disease and whether the necessary treatments and
interventions to reduce the source of illness are made, such as
hoof trimming, sectioning, cleaning and disinfection.
Observations are also made on the level of fear, indicating how
the animals react to human contact. The values that underpin
care is that humans are responsible for controlling the welfare of
production animals, and that absence of disease and functioning
well in the production system are indications of good animal
welfare.  
The values of naturalness and care are connected to freedom
versus control, and they exclude each other in the same way that
justice and mercy exclude each other. The more you pursue animal
welfare as naturalness the more difficult is it to control and take
care of their well-being, and vice versa. This is the source of value
complementarity in assessments of animal welfare, a value
complementarity that shows up as very important in, for example,
sustainability assessments that compare organic and conventional
production systems, because naturalness plays a key role in
organic production usually not found in conventional systems.
Nature quality: authentic versus rich nature
Nature is a prolific and diverse concept, but in relation to the issue
of nature quality the main conflicting perspectives can be
characterized as authentic versus rich (cf. Tybirk et al. 2004). Two
overarching conceptions of the relationship between man and
nature are the “distinctive” conception that sees man and nature
as basically separate, and the “systemic” conception that sees man
as basically an integrated part of nature (and vice versa). The
distinctive and systemic conceptions of nature largely correspond
to two major schools in conservation biology: compositionalism
and functionalism (Callicott et al. 1999).  
Within these two basic conceptions of nature, there are three
“archetypical” normative views of what good nature is (Alrøe and
Kristensen 2003, Tybirk et al. 2004). Within the distinctive
conception of nature we find two views: the culturist view of
nature (often connected with conventional agriculture and a
religious history of human dominance over nature), which values
nature that is controlled, well-ordered, cultivated, and useful to
man; and the naturalist view of nature (mostly connected to
natural history and conservation biology), which values the wild
and authentic nature, untouched and uncontrolled by man. The
systemic conception of nature gives rise to an ecologist view of
nature (mostly connected to ecology and organic agriculture),
which values the rich, but not untouched, nature that provides
intimate and mutually benign relations between humans and
nature. Whereas the culturist and naturalist views disagree on
what good nature is, they may agree on dividing land into (nature
poor) cultural land and authentic natural land. But the ecologist
view will disagree with this division and insist on a nature rich,
though not authentic, cultural land. In connection with
sustainable food systems, research studies on nature quality as
authentic nature will look in the small biotopes in hedges and
ditches, where biodiversity in the form of rare and threatened
species may be found. The prevalence of common species on
agricultural land will be of little interest. And mostly they will
want to look elsewhere, in nature areas that may be afflicted by
agricultural activities. Research studies on nature quality as rich
nature will look in the fields, where biodiversity in the form of
robust and plentiful species may support soil fertility and crop
growth, and for common species that may enrich recreation in the
countryside.  
The values of authentic and rich are thus connected to entirely
opposite conceptions of man’s relation to nature, and this is the
source of value complementarity in assessments of nature quality.
This value complementarity shows up as very important in, for
example, sustainability assessments that compare organic and
conventional production systems because the view of nature
mostly differs between these two systems and between their
connected research system. One of the basic ethical principles of
organic agriculture thus says directly that agriculture should
cooperate with nature and that the production should emulate
and benefit from nature’s systems and cycles, and help sustain
them (IFOAM 2005).
Sustainability: three perspectives on growth and sustainable
development
There are other well-known conflicts around key value-laden
concepts that are important to the assessment of food system
sustainability; concepts such as soil quality (Schjønning et al.
2004), health (e.g., between preventing illness and building
resilience), food safety (e.g., between the precautionary principle
and evidence-based risk assessment), and food quality (e.g.,
between standardization and diversity, such as local and seasonal
food), and not least the concept of sustainability itself. Our last
example here concerns value complementarity on an overall level
of sustainability assessment compared with the previous
examples, namely three different perspectives on growth and
sustainable development: growth without borders, growth within
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limits, and growth and ecological injustice (cf. Byrne and Glover
2002, Byrne et al. 2006).
Growth without borders
From a neoliberal economic perspective, globalization does not
present a problem. On the contrary, globalization is seen as an
improvement of the possibilities for free market forces to allocate
resources, which in this view is economically and socially ideal
and a prerequisite for liberal democracy. The solution to world
poverty and environmental problems lies in growth and open
markets, because growing wealth will furnish more than enough
capital to repair whatever damage the growth may have caused.
This position can be characterized as having a “weak” conception
of sustainability. It presupposes an independent, always growing
economic system as well as well-distributed benefits from the
system. The field “environmental economics” recognizes that
there are market failures with respect to the environment and
advocates institutions to internalize external costs, so that markets
can settle on optimal levels of pollution and ecological losses.
From this perspective, sustainable development is measured by a
single economic indicator: growth in the value of society’s
collected capital. The price for this simplicity is an assumption of
substitutability, that all natural resources and environmental
goods can be replaced with produced goods or, in other words,
that there is no critical natural capital.
Growth within limits
Other economic perspectives endorse stronger conceptions of
sustainability. For example, many believe that the economic
system is dependent on a finite, vulnerable, ecological system and
that there are only limited possibilities of substituting natural
capital with manufactured capital (Daly and Farley 2003). The
field “ecological economics” is a pluralistic, transdisciplinary
alternative to market liberalism that considers ecological limits
and the scale of the material and energy flows to which the
economical processes connect. A key argument from the
ecological economics perspective is that sustainable scale, just
distribution, and an efficient allocation are three distinct, but
interdependent, problems requiring different policy instruments
(Daly and Farley 2003). Sustainable scale here implies that the
throughput associated with economic activities remains within
the natural capacity of the ecosystem to absorb wastes and
regenerate resources.
Growth and ecological injustice
A third position comes from the field “political ecology,” which
does not see development and efficiency as solutions, but as the
primary sources of social and ecological problems (Byrne and
Glover 2002). Political ecology opposes both globalization and
ecological modernization because both presume trade is
essentially an economic issue. Political ecology, on the other hand,
situates trade within a political frame as a contest between
resources taken as “commodities” and taken as “commons,” a
contest, in essence, of ecological justice, which is concerned with
the fair distribution of the common environment between the
inhabitants of the planet (Low and Gleeson 1998). From this
perspective, sustainable development in the form of ecological
modernization has primarily been the agenda of the wealthy.
Sustainable development is seen not as a remedy for problems
created by globalization, but a reform program that currently
tends to advance a globalization agenda. Together, globalization
and sustainable development spur a replacement of commons
valuation with commodity valuation that benefits multinational
corporations and exploitive commodity interests, while
simultaneously undermining sustainable commons systems and
community governance.  
Such differences in the interpretation of sustainability have
important implications for sustainability assessment tool choice
and the decision-making processes (cf. Ness et al. 2007). The three
perspectives on growth and sustainable development presented
here: economic growth and substitutability versus critical
ecological limits versus fair distribution of the common
environment, are based on values that are clearly, at least in some
ways, incompatible. The assumption of substitutability goes
directly against the ideas of critical ecological limits and planetary
boundaries, and the simple goal of maximum economic growth
goes against the fair distribution of the common environment.
(The idea of critical ecological limits may be compatible with the
fair distribution of environments, but one may still be blind to the
other.) These issues of value complementarity occur at the very
top level of any sustainability assessment and are therefore of
critical importance to the construction and results of tools for
sustainability assessment and transition.
DISCUSSION
In the introduction we outlined two major problematics of
sustainability assessment that are still unresolved today, the
problem of integration and the problem of implementation, and
suggested that the principle of complementarity could help clarify
and better handle these problematics. We have now investigated
how the principle of complementarity may be generalized from
its original formulation in quantum physics, and described two
specific forms of complementarity in sustainability assessment of
food systems, observer stance complementarity and value
complementarity. As we have indicated, the differences, conflicts,
and constraints that we connect with issues of complementarity
have often been known to some degree and in some form. But the
principle of complementarity can help understand how
fundamental these problems are (or not), and thereby what can
and what cannot be done about them.  
We discuss whether these issues of complementarity can indeed
help explain and deal with problems of integration and
implementation in sustainability assessment, and what the further
implications of thinking in terms of complementarity are.
Although the problems of integration and implementation are
separate problems, they are not independent, and in the discussion
we will also point out cross-cutting issues.
The integration problem and value complementarity
Sustainability assessment tools integrate a range of different
indicators and fields of assessment, and the integration problem
concerns the surplus of possibilities for integration. Value
complementarity points out that different assessments may be
incompatible because they are based on different and
incompatible values.
Integration and levels of assessment
We have analyzed examples of value complementarity at two
different levels, specific issues about animal welfare and nature
quality and complementarity issues concerning sustainability at
an overall level. It is clear that in relation to problems of
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integration in sustainability assessment, the overall value
complementarity found in the different understandings of growth
and sustainable development concern the choice of a framework
for integration, whereas the specific issues of value
complementarity concern integration choices within a certain
framework. However, it is also clear that the specific issues of
value complementarity are not independent of the overall
complementarity between different meanings of sustainability.
For example, the different values connected to nature quality,
which we characterized as distinct (man and nature separate)
versus systemic (man and nature integrated) are connected to
sustainability as growth without borders versus growth within
limits.  
At present, such connections and differences between values at
different levels of assessment, and in different fields of
assessment, are difficult to elucidate in sustainability assessments
because values are mostly hidden when the tools are applied.
There is a need for normative transparency and better ways of
handling values in sustainability assessment tools to enable
developers to compare values across levels and fields and thereby
ensure normative consistency in the integration processes. This is
also important with regard to the implementation problem
because it will enable users to compare their own values with the
built-in values in the tools, which can assist tool choice and help
steer their transformation to more sustainable practices.
Complementarity and food system dilemmas
To instigate sustainability transformations we need to handle, on
the one hand, disagreements and complementarities due to
differences in perspectives and values and, on the other hand,
systemic dilemmas where actions that promote sustainability in
one area have negative effects in other areas because of internal
structures and dynamics in the system. (In sustainability
assessment such systemic dilemmas may also be considered a form
of indicator interaction, see, e.g., Binder et al. 2012). In some cases
these two can be difficult to discern. But even though they both
pose important constraints, they must be handled quite
differently. An example of a systemic dilemma is found in organic
pig farming, where the goal to increase animal welfare by
establishing free range production systems may jeopardize
environmental goals because of problems of controlling the
deposition of animal manure in these systems and the leakage of
nutrient due to the pigs rooting up the fields. However, this
dilemma is distinct from, e.g., the example of value
complementarity between naturalness and care that we described
above. Such dilemmas may be more or less difficult to handle, but
they can be addressed by way of system innovation, and they do
not necessarily pose the kind of unsurmountable problems that
complementarity does.
Indexation as a machine to hide information
In sustainability assessment a solution to the problem of
complexity, which is also a part of the implementation problem,
is often attempted by way of indexation. Indexation is a prime
example of how integration can work against the clarification of
values in overall assessments. Indexation is a process whereby
different kinds of assessments in different fields of sustainability
are weighted and combined, or integrated, into a number, usually
on a scale from 0 to 100. (As such, indexation is a further move
toward the quantification of values, which sustainability
assessment is based on in the form of indicator scores.) The result
of indexation may be one index, such as the Ecological Footprint
and the Happy Planet Index, or, more typically in food system
assessment, a range of indexes for different overall fields of
sustainability that are presented in a diagram (see, e.g., Marchand
et al. 2014, Peano et al. 2014). Multicriteria assessment is thus an
alternative to the simple indexes that retains the visibility of
different fields or areas of assessment. Yet this is still based on
indexation within each of these areas.  
Indexation can thus be seen as a very efficient integration machine.
But this integration machine works by hiding information in form
of, e.g., the perspectives and values involved and the limitations
of the scientific knowledge used, which are all necessary parts of
the cognitive context of sustainability assessment. Thereby,
indexation also efficiently hides any occurrence of value
complementarity and hinders the recognition and handling of
value complementarity issues.  
Indexes are simple and therefore very efficient in communicating
sustainability assessments. This can ideally assist implementation.
But indexation also hides all the value differences and nuances in
the plurality of perspectives and criteria, as well as any
complementarities, dilemmas, etc. And by providing a specific
answer it closes off  continued communication. In this way indexes
can also exclude stakeholders and at the same time hide the
reasons for why they should not be excluded.
The implementation problem and observer stance
complementarity
The implementation problem concerns the difficulties of bringing
complex sustainability assessments into practice and thereby
instigating sustainability transformations. Observer stance
complementarity points out that different approaches to
sustainability assessment may be incompatible because they are
based on different and incompatible modes of science that can be
characterized as detached and involved.
Assessment, participation, and observer stance complementarity
Triste et al. (2014) provide a systematic reflection on the
development and implementation process of a particular
sustainability assessment tool, the Monitoring Tool for Integrated
Farm Sustainability (MOTIFS), a study of a type that has scarcely
been performed before. MOTIFS was developed with the aim of
becoming widely adopted by farmers and farm advisors, but this
result was not achieved, despite a participatory tool development
process, which involved a wide range of stakeholders. This lack
of implementation is not uncommon. “Adoption of sustainability
assessment tools in agricultural practice is often disappointing,”
as Triste et al. note.  
Triste et al. (2014) analyze the barriers and success factors that
influenced the general adoption of MOTIFS, and point to the
tool development process as a critical success factor for adoption.
For example, MOTIFS aimed to be a communicative monitoring
tool suitable for social learning, but, “This multifunction aim
created tensions that are reflected in indicator choices. The
objective of monitoring resulted in the development of indicators
with a high-precision measurement. However, to be suited for
learning purposes, indicators need to be understandable and
transparent.” (Marchand et al. 2014)  
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According to the thesis in the present paper, such tension is to be
expected since the different functions of monitoring and learning
are subject to observer stance complementarity.  
The reflection process by Triste et al. showed three clusters of
lessons learned for sound tool development: (1) institutional
embeddedness, addressing the researchers’ role in the
development process and the need for shared process visions and
objectives in an adaptive learning process, (2) stakeholders’
ownership, pointing out that farmers must recognize and accept
their responsibility in achieving a more sustainable agricultural
practice, and (3) tool functions, stating that different tool
functions require different specifications concerning implementation
settings and end users.  
On this basis, Triste et al. (2014) suggest actions to take for
researchers involved in sustainability assessments. They
recommend research and development of better guidelines on
what tools are relevant for which end users and what purposes,
complementary use of tools, and the development of flexible tools
for varying situations. But they recognize that the scientific basis
for this is still weak. Referring to a number of other authors, they
also recommend learning from stakeholders and end users. Active
stakeholder involvement can stimulate the sense of ownership,
increase awareness of problems and acceptance of measures
required to solve problems, improve decision making by
accounting for diversity in viewpoints and knowledge, increase
support for the assessment outcomes, and enable mutual learning.
However, organizing and managing good stakeholder
involvement is a big challenge. There can be significant differences
between designers’ and users’ interpretations of a problem, and
it is important that researchers and experts do not monopolize
knowledge. Participation should be institutionalized and end
users should be involved early in the process to support tool design
that fits the intended purpose and end users.  
Although the complementary use of tools and the diversity of
viewpoints is among the explanations given by Trieste et al. (2014)
for the lack of adaptation of MOTIFS for practical use, the deeper
analysis of complementarity that we have provided here can help
substantiate these discussions in the scientific community. In
particular, a greater awareness of the complementarity between
detached observer stances aimed at description and monitoring
and involved observer stances aimed at development and learning
would help understanding the barriers to implementation
experienced in the case of MOTIFS and in other cases.  
Lack of understanding of this methodological complementarity
could be a reason why many complex, scientific assessments do
not lead to the transformations in practice that are expected.
Seeing the implementation problem as (at least partly) a problem
of complementarity may particularly help explain why many
participatory assessment approaches do not result in the expected
sustainability transformations in practice (cf. Reed 2008). No
degree of participation in an assessment that is based on an
observer stance from without the food system (be that a farm, a
food chain, or, e.g., the organic food system) will change that
assessment to an observer stance from within the food system.
Implementation, stakeholder perspectives and complementarity
If  the explanation of the implementation problem as (to some
degree) due to observer stance complementarity is correct, the
implementation problem cannot be resolved by developing still
more advanced and complex assessment methods, if  these
approaches employ a detached observer stance that is directed by
the norms of science. End users such as farmers and advisors wish
to adjust or select indicators depending on the goals and the
context-specific needs, conditions, and characteristics of the
farms (Marchand et al. 2014). New approaches must be found
that provide ways for how stakeholder perspectives and values
can actually enter into the sustainability assessment processes (as
attempted by the MultiTrust project).  
There are multiple kinds of actors and stakeholders in food
systems with very different values and goals, and the existing
sustainability assessment tools are generally inept in
communicating values. It is therefore not a simple or straight-
forward case to carry out communication processes with the
relevant stakeholders, which make values and perspectives explicit
in sustainability assessments. Key questions are how values in the
form of orientors or normative criteria are built into multicriteria
assessment tools in the selections and condensations made (cf.
Gasparatos 2010), how they can be exposed, and how these built-
in values relate to the values of food systems, societal goals, and
the interests of different stakeholders (cf. Gregory 2000). There
is a need for normative transparency to be able to address both
issues of value complementarity and observer stance
complementarity.  
In response to the widespread disappointment in the results of
stakeholder involvement (as described in the introduction), we
conclude that participation in itself  is impotent. Participation will
not lead to successful implementation of sustainability
assessments unless the participation involves stakeholder
perspectives in the form of explicitly incorporating their values
and in the form of assessments from within instead of from
without.
Complementarity between assessment and transformation
In line with the above discussion, sustainability assessment and
sustainability transformation can be seen as two mutually
excluding, but necessary, ways of addressing the goal of
sustainable development of food systems. In assessment
processes, focus is on showing how sustainable, e.g., a type of farm
or a food sector is, and to do this science takes a detached observer
stance. Here, the weight is on means of perception (measurement
procedures, instruments, etc.) and ways of representing the object
(models, diagrams, etc.). In transition processes focus is on
making, e.g., a farm or a food chain more sustainable, and to do
this science takes an involved actor stance. Here, the weight is on
the means of operation (initiatives, interventions, changes of
practices, etc.).  
This does not mean that transition processes are necessarily blind
processes without assessment elements, or that assessments can
never lead to transition processes. The point we want to make
here is that, paradoxically, these two fundamental modes of
sustainability science are in their essence complementary by virtue
of their different cognitive interests and observer stances. It is not
possible to find some optimal middle form that incorporates the
strength of both forms. This is what is now becoming recognized
in the analyses of, and reflections upon, the use of different
sustainability assessment tools (e.g., Marchand et al. 2014, Triste
et al. 2014). Science is essential to the societal goal of
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sustainability, but for science to have a constructive role in the
transition to more sustainable structures and practices in food
systems, and elsewhere, it needs to be acutely aware of the
importance of different perspectives and the complementarities
connected to the difference between detached and involved
observer stances.
Further implications of complementarity and perspectivism
Complementarity and other perspectival differences
Different scientific perspectives are autopoietic social systems
that create and reproduce their own meaning. They specialize in
observing specific phenomena or observing the world in specific
ways. Disagreements between scientific perspectives are therefore
not necessarily due to one being right and the other wrong, but
may often be due to differences in perspective (Alrøe and Noe
2011). Perspectival differences are a key problematic issue in
interdisciplinary research on wicked problems (such as the
problems of food system sustainability), which often leads to
failure because of a lack of mutual understanding and respect
between disciplines and, often, the hegemony of a single
discipline. The solution to such problems is a greater awareness
of the role of perspectives in science and in interdisciplinary and
transdisciplinary research (cf. Alrøe and Noe 2014a).  
A further complication is that tools that aim to describe the world
as it is, from a detached observer stance, are often considered
“more scientific” than tools that aim to support development of
the system from an involved observer stance (cf. Alrøe and
Kristensen 2002). Such hegemonic ideas are detrimental to
interdisciplinary research (Alrøe and Noe 2014a). The realization
that approaches aimed at description and development represent
different modes of empirical science that can be equally scientific,
though they differ in cognitive interest and purpose, is thus a
necessary step toward better handling such issues of
complementarity in sustainability assessment.  
The differentiation of science into specialized scientific
perspectives is an important reason why it is often difficult to
communicate across scientific perspectives, in terms of what
Thomas Kuhn (1996) called incommensurability. Each scientific
perspective has its own phenomenal world, its own representation
(as defined above) of the world entailed in theories, models,
concepts, classifications, observation apparatuses, and examples.
This perspectival understanding is a deeper reason of
incommensurability than language differences, which Kuhn
stated as the reason for incommensurability, because it is tied into
the specific observational apparatus and the specific forms of
interaction with research objects provided by it (cf. Alrøe and Noe
2014a).  
We must expect different scientific perspectives to sometimes
bring forth mutually excluding representations of the research
object, which none the less all seem important to our
understanding; that is, complementary phenomena in Bohr’s
sense. Incommensurability means that it is impossible to
incorporate representations of the (presumed) same object from
one perspective into another because of differences in the
theoretical framework, concepts, etc. Still, the different
observations may be performed concurrently and supplement
each other to give a fuller, if  multifaceted, representation of the
object. In contrast, complementarity means that the observations
exclude each other because of the observational conditions, and
“allows us only to make a choice between the different
complementary types of phenomena we want to study” (Bohr
1949:223). For instance, doing farm development research from
an involved observer stance excludes doing monitoring research
on how that farm performs “on its own” from a detached observer
stance because of the interactivity (or intra-activity in Barad’s
terms) of observation and the individuality of farms.
Complementarity and problem solving
Perspectival disagreement, incommensurability and complementarity
may all be problematic in cross-disciplinary research activities
(and science-based sustainability assessment and transformation
is, in effect, cross-disciplinary research), but very little has been
done to investigate what complementarity means for cross-
disciplinary research. Even less has been done to identify
differences between perspectival disagreement, incommensurability,
and complementarity and to investigate how to handle these
different forms of constraint in cross-disciplinary research. We
think such work could prove very helpful in addressing the key
problems of integration and implementation in sustainability
assessment and transformation, because even though these
different differences between perspectives (perspectival
disagreement, incommensurability, and complementarity) may
all pose important constraints, these constraints must be handled
quite differently.  
When problems of complementarity are confronted in
sustainability assessment, they are typically recognized as very
difficult problems that involve a choice between different and in
some way incompatible perspectives, approaches, or methods, but
not as problems of complementarity in the radical sense that we
have explored in this paper. This means that such problems are
handled in different, but all inadequate or abortive ways, such as:
(A) disregarding (or overlooking) the differences and pretending
(or believing) that the methods of observation are not
incompatible, (B) choosing one method and ignoring, dismissing,
or countering the other(s), and (C) trying to mix or combine or
merge the different methods or construct an in-between method.  
An improved understanding of complementarity as a general
issue in science can help in two ways:  
1. It can help understanding the fundamental cognitive
character of complementarity, which means that
complementarity cannot be overcome by methodological
advances, only handled in better or worse ways, and focus
attention on how to handle issues of complementarity
better. 
2. It can help distinguish between issues of complementarity
and other problematic issues, and thereby between problems
that may be resolved and those that may not, and focus
attention on how to better recognize issues of
complementarity.
CONCLUSIONS
Sustainability is a paradoxical perspective because it strives to
comprise the whole to sustain life and well-being, but it must rely
on a multitude of perspectives, perspectives that may be
complementary and therefore mutually exclude each other. In
fact, we have shown that complementarity plays an important
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role in understanding two key problems of sustainability
assessment, the problem of integrating different assessments and
indicators and the problem of implementing assessments in
practice. Unlike many other problems of sustainability
assessment, complementarity is of a fundamental character
connected to the very conditions for observation. Therefore
complementarity cannot be overcome methodologically; only
handled better or worse.  
We have identified two forms of complementarity in sustainability
assessment and transformation. Value complementarity concerns
a basic ontological path dependency. Two values, such as
naturalness and care in animal welfare, or sustainability as growth
without borders and growth within limits, may be located on
different paths that cannot both be taken at the same time.
Observer stance complementarity concerns a basic epistemological
condition. Two perspectives, such as assessment for monitoring
and assessment for learning and development, or assessment from
within a food chain and assessment from without, may exclude
each other because of the conditions for observation and
representation.  
Science is essential to the societal goal of sustainability, but these
issues of complementarity impede the constructive role of science
in the transition to more sustainable structures and practices in
food systems. Participation in itself  is impotent. The agencies of
sustainability assessment and transformation need to be acutely
aware of the importance of different perspectives and values and
the complementarities that may be connected to these differences.  
An improved understanding of complementarity can help to
better recognize and handle issues of complementarity. These
deliberations have relevance not only for sustainability
assessment, but more generally for transdisciplinary research on
wicked problems.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
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